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Military hardware + control logic
Item class
Destroyed
Military vehicles
6,529
Tanks
5,720
Field guns/mortars
3,467
Drones
2,211
Multiple rocket launchers
868
Surface to air missiles
380
Aircraft
321
Helicopters
161
Total
19,657
Military personnel
Ukrainian troops held
* est: 6,000
Injured swapped
* est: 250
Individual troops killed
est: 76,000
Likely injured not captured
** est:105,000
Voluntary departure
est: 25,000
Cut off - likely captured
est: 3,500
Total out of action
est: 215,750
Sources: MOD RF;
RP: TASS; Spunik; RT and Pravda.
XC: ACP. ACP Field stringers.

Most casualty figures have become inexact because of randomized reporting but they are likely to exceed all the figures presented.
In general, we are not in a position to verify this data but past experience with the sources and in particular MOD RF they tend to be reasonably accurate.

We are unable to find reliable sources on destroyed Russian assets and personnel. Ukrainain and foreign intel sources have been found to be unreliable.
UKRAINIAN MILIARY HARDWARE & PERSONNEL LOSSES

24/02/2022 - 13/10/2022
STATUS

The Ukrainian army has made significant gains in the Kharkiv region in the last 36 hours. However, this advance encountered very little resistance because there were no regular Russian troops in the region but only Home Guard units who are not fully trained military personnel. This was an odd gap in the Russian strategy and so far we have not been able to find an explanation. This advance continues but is now slowing down and Russia is consolidating a response which is likely to be initiated on a fully coordinated basis. Although the Ukrainian advance was rapid trhe Russian withdrawl was ordered and auxiliary support (air/artillary) inflicted very heavy casulaties on the Ukrainian side. Now being confirmed by multiple infield sources it seems that Ukrain lost multiple thousands of troops killed because they advanced over open territory.

In the meantime, Rusian troops have been ordered to withdraw from those locations where there is a risk that they could be encircled and captured/eliminated. Russia media have been very critical of this lapse on Russsia's part because of the Ukrainian habit of indiscriminate killing of anyone suspected to have collaborated with the Russians in occupied zones.

On the other hand, the tactics applied in this event were not typical of the current state of Ukrainian actions and it is suggested that a large contingent of more seasoned foreign militia were involved. The size of any NATO component was not estimated but this evolution, if correct, is a development inviting a more rigorous response from Russia and a possible change in overall strategy.

Otherwise the rate of destruction of Ukrainian military hardware has increased following a decline in the previous week. Estimated Ukrainian military personel losses in the last 8 days, but not including this latest advance where losses were relatively light, seem to have been between 2,250 and 2,750 troops. SASI (Southern Atlantic Strategic Intelligence) estimates that Ukraine has now effectively lost all original operational military assets.

On the 24th February, 2022 Ukraine's operational military capabilities consisted of an estimated 14,500 strategic hardware items. Based on the MOD RF figures most of these have been eliminated and Ukraine is surviving with the NATO supplied assets as well as some remaining items from the original complement.

The loss of trained personnnel has been excessive although it is no longer possible to provide accurate estimates. The reality is that Ukraine lost the military contest about 12 weeks ago and currently has few capabilities West of the Donbass to continue fighting except for some missile batteries, rockets and artillery, which are being taken out methodologically. Ukraine received a large contingent of tanks put to use a week ago where something like 100 were destroyed.

Based on a roundly constant rate of attrition of around 90 major hardware items each day, now for over 193 days (see total), SASI has reduced its estimate on Donbass being fully liberated to between 25-35 days. This has been adjusted because Russian forces have changed their tactics to ones that are more time consuming but designed to be highly destructive to Ukrainian personnel while protecting the exposure of Russian personnel. The Russian tendency is also to avoid civilian casualties; the reverse of Ukrainian tactics who have emphasised terror tactics by targeting civilians in the Donbass, now for almost nine years starting in 2014.

The highly fortified lines built by Ukraine over the last 8 years only provide fixed and easy targets for artillary and missiles. This is the reason for the apparent lull in fighting which has nothing to do with Ukrainian "counter offences" which, given the situation on the ground, are unlikely to occur because of missing hardware components and lack of experienced personnel capable of coordinating anything effective.

An added detail is rather than attempt a broadside exposed wide frontal attack the Russians pile in attacks on small Ukrainian asset and troop concentrations conveniently mapped out by the fortified lines. This means that even with logistic backup in place, eventually there are literally no active Ukrainian troops left to make use of any supplies. The advance then progresses to the next point, selected at ease, of Ukrainian assets and troop concentrations. This is why the only minor events provided with widespread high profile publiciy in UK media are actions by small teams "behind enemy lines" for example, in Crimea. Resort to this type of action is because air defenses are too good and Ukraine has no effective airforce or cover. Therefore these commando-type all for "effect" and morale boosting publicity raising acts take place. These are an irritation to Russia but have absolutely no impact on the progress of the fighting.

Frontline Ukrainian "troops" are increasingly untrained, poorly equipped and managed. Unverified but multiple reports indicate that contingents of nationalists are stationed behind the less well trained personnel to execute those attempting to surrender. Surrendering is only possible when Russian advance contingents outflank and out number the Ukrainian groups. Russian tactics in flanking operations appear to be increasingly successful. Ukrainian positions are dug-ins, poorly conceived and based on World War II, or even World War I, concepts. The expectation of a Russian advance was that it would come from the East. However, in practice, Russians advance from directions chosen by them, including from the South, West and North. In this way they are able to expose weak points. Increasingly captured Ukrainian troops are found to be without any remaining ammunition.

SASI has assessed that Ukraine, alone, no longer has a credible fighting force and the Western strategy of encouraging Ukraine to sacrifice its military personnel against impossible odds, now involving largely inexperienced personnel, to be unacceptable and this will lead to serious recriminations at some later date. SASI considers surrender and negotiation to be the only reasonable solution and does not expect Russia to take any exaggerated advantage of this because Russia's aims were always clear and their is a tendency for Russia to adhere to objectives and stated intentions.

The excessive amount of inoperable military assets in Ukraine at the start of the campaign was largely the result of corruption. Some of the funds supplied for military equipment maintenance were paid back as "political contributions" as well as into personal offshore accounts and used to purchase real estate in offshore locations such as London.

The endemic corruption within military units is alleged to have given rise to large amounts of the "equipment donations" finding their way into profitable black market transactions bolstering offshore accounts.
1 Especially tanks & all vehicle types